

anniversary commemoration of the end of the war." In our opinion, Secretary Heyman made the right decision for the wrong reason. The problem was not the coupling of history with commemoration. It was that history had been given a counter-cultural spin. The problem was not that the exhibit was analytical. The problem was that the analysis was distorted.

The theme of "history versus nostalgia" has been picked up and elevated to extreme levels by activists in the academic community. They use language like "historical cleansing" and "censorship." They would have you believe that the issue is a contest between honest scholarship and blind patriotism. That is simply not true. Our concerns from the start have always centered around balance and context.

It is rare that we find ourselves on the same side of the issue as *The Washington Post*, so it is worth noting that the editorial for January 20, 1995 reaches the same conclusion we do in this regard. The *Post* said that the earlier drafts of the *Enola Gay* script were "incredibly propagandistic and intellectually shabby." It also said that the curators had repeatedly made the controversy worse by their "misplaced condescension and refusal to see their criticisms as anything but the carping of the insufficiently sophisticated." The problem with the *Enola Gay* exhibit in many ways was the result of refusal by the curators to accept constructive criticism from a wide range of experts, including but not limited to military historians and scholars, who put forth a mainstream view of the circumstances surrounding President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Instead they put great reliance and undue weight on the radical scholarships and assessments that are, to put it mildly, not universally shared by those who are well informed on the subject.

As we pointed out in our very first report on the *Enola Gay*, this is not the first flawed exhibit at the Air and Space Museum or within the Smithsonian complex. We believe that actions should be taken to ensure that curators in our national museums have the benefit of review and comment by a full range of recognized experts and that mechanisms be put into place to ensure that this happens. Only then will the American public be assured that our national museums reflect the broad scholarship that might reasonably be expected.

We applaud the efforts taken to date by Secretary Heyman. He has initiated a management review of the Air and Space Museum and has shown himself willing to hear advice. As we see it, a consensus is developing that says curators need to pay particular attention to their audiences.

Finally, let me say that we, like most Americans, regard the Smithsonian as a national treasure. As you might imagine, our highest regard has traditionally been for the National Air and Space Museum. For those of us in the aerospace community this museum is special beyond compare. Our natural position is to be

in strong support of the Air and Space Museum, not fighting with it. We sincerely hope that a new era is about to begin at Air and Space, and with it a rededication to the principles and purposes that will allow us to once again become an advocate for the museum, not its adversary.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Our next witness is Mr. Bob Manhan, who is the assistant director of the National Legislative Service for the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Mr. Manhan?

**TESTIMONY OF BOB MANHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOR-
EIGN WARS**

Mr. MANHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Veterans of Foreign Wars to appear here this morning.

Of our 2.1 million members, approximately half of them are veterans of World War II. While all of them did not necessarily see service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater of operation, our entire membership unanimously agrees that President Truman on the 14th of June 1945 made the correct political, strategic decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were available to President Truman then are still well-documented today. In essence it boils down to the fact that Imperial Japan was not ready to unconditionally surrender and that a physical land invasion of Japan would cause horrifying American casualties.

My own qualification for being here this morning is the fact that I participated in reviewing four of the Smithsonian's scripts, I participated in a working luncheon one-on-one with Dr. Martin Harwit, and I attended three working sessions at the Smithsonian headquarters. In addition, about 2 months after Dr. Heyman cancelled the exhibit I did attend the jointly sponsored symposium at the Ann Arbor campus of the University of Michigan wherein Dr. Heyman conducted a post-mortem study on what went wrong with this exhibit.

Having said that, and having the opportunity now to be the last one up at the plate, I want you to know that the VFW agrees with everything that my predecessors have said up until this point. This allows me to touch on our own very brief seven-page written testimony that we submitted. It is structured, as you have already seen, to provide you with four basic managerial questions that you may consider asking next week when the Smithsonian tells their side of the story.

Our first question is: How could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their flawed initial broad-based concept without receiving any peer group pressure or review? And once it was obvious that they were controversial, why weren't managerial corrections made sooner?

The second question: Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in the first place for this particular exhibit?

The third question: What roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Chairman Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? Both are Air and Space Museum employees and were involved to some degree in the first script. The first script was not made available at any time to the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

The fourth and last question is: Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take action sooner to correct the exhibit rather than to simply cancel the show?

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This concludes the VFW's presentation.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manhan follows:]

STATEMENT OF BOB MANHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Thank you for inviting the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) to participate in this very important hearing. Because of the thrust of this hearing the VFW offers four basic managerial questions that impact directly on the *Enola Gay* Exhibit. We believe the answers, which can only be provided by the Smithsonian, will help establish guidelines to preclude that institution from again getting bogged down in a similar incident; i.e., one that confuses feelings with facts and lacks leadership. The questions are:

1. How could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their flawed initial broad-based concept without receiving any peer group review and, once in trouble, why weren't management corrections made?
2. Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in the first place for this particular exhibit?
3. What roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Chairman Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? Both are Air and Space Museum employees and were involved to some degree with the first script.
4. Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take action sooner to correct the exhibit rather than to simply cancel the show?

The remainder of our testimony is structured to provide background information on each of these questions.

About half of our 2.1 million members are veterans of World War II. While all did not necessarily fight in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre of operations, all members firmly believe that President Truman on June 14, 1945, made the correct decision to authorize the dropping of Atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were known fifty years ago are still well documented today. In essence, we knew that the Japanese would never surrender unconditionally and that a military invasion would inflict horrifying casualties on American troops.

The VFW qualifications to participate at this hearing are based on the fact that we worked with all the principles on the Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum's planned exhibit titled, *The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II*, from May 1994 to January 30, 1995, and a representative attended the post-mortem symposium sponsored jointly by the Smithsonian Institution and The University of Michigan in mid-April of 1995. During this eleven month period of time the VFW provided corrections and commentaries to exhibit scripts two and three. We then reviewed script number four which was primarily an American Legion effort that proved unsatisfactory to all concerned, including the Legion. The VFW again worked with The Air Force Association (AFA) and The Retired Officers Association (TROA) on the Smithsonian's script number five and a follow-on new sixth introductory section of the military situation in the Asian-

Pacific area from the 1930's to December 1944. This last script was issued on December 15, 1994, and Secretary Heyman cancelled the entire effort about a month later on January 29, 1995. During this same period of time the VFW attended three meetings at "The Castle" or Headquarters of the Smithsonian Institution. Under Secretary Constance Newman was at every meeting, Secretary Heyman was at one meeting, and Dr. Martin Harwit also attended one of these sessions. The veterans organizations attending all three meetings were the VFW, the AFA, and TROA. As an aside, in mid-October Dr. Martin Harwit invited just myself and Bob Currie, the Executive Director of the VFW, to a working luncheon at the Air and Space Museum. Also present was the Smithsonian's Director of Government Relations, Mr. Mark Rodgers. In summary, the VFW's position was to tell Dr. Harwit that after going through three scripts we believed that the media was becoming involved on the side of historical accuracy rather than accepting the revisionist approach the Smithsonian was taking at that point in time. The VFW also added that there was a real possibility the Republican Party would be the majority in the new 104th Congress and that Republicans generally would support a strong national defense and would be less likely to accept a revisionist concept for the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Dr. Harwit agreed with both comments.

Secretary Heyman cancelled this exhibit on January 30, 1995. This was announced at the third and last meeting at "The Castle." The rationale of doing this boiled down to this one overriding reason: "I have concluded that we [the Smithsonian Institution] made a basic error in attempting to couple an historic treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th anniversary commemoration of the end of the war. Exhibitions have many purposes, equally worthwhile. But we need to know which of many goals is paramount, and not to confuse them."

There was general agreement between the VFW, AFA, and TROA that the fifth script was a fairly decent package but not yet to the point where any of us would endorse it. However, after all the time, effort, and money that had been expended up to this point on presenting a balanced exhibit, Dr. Heyman's decision was a surprise, at least to the VFW.

The symposium held about two and a half months later on the campus of the University of Michigan was titled "Presenting History: Museums In A Democratic Society." This all day affair was divided into the following three sessions:

- Exhibiting Controversial Subjects;
- The *Enola Gay* Exhibit: A Case Study in Controversy; and,
- Museums in a Democratic Society.

It is interesting to note that Thomas D. Crouch, the Chairman of the Department of Aeronautics at the National Air and Space Museum, was the "Smithsonian's" person during the *Enola Gay* case study session. Please recall that Dr. Harwit had not yet resigned. A total of some 26 eminently qualified scholars, researchers, and historians participated in the symposium. It was the collective judgment of this group that whenever and wherever it is possible to deal with persons who participated in an historical event they should be interviewed and their position(s) clearly stated. In focusing on the *Enola Gay* Exhibit the group felt the effort was handled poorly throughout. Oddly enough, Tom Crouch did not concur. In the judgment of the VFW his position was simply that one can't make the American veterans "feel good" and, at the same time, present a meaningful exhibit on the use of atomic bombs in 1945.

First, how could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their initial broad-based concept without any peer group review? Please recall the title was "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Ostensibly, this was to have been scheduled for a late May 1995 opening date to commemorate, well, the end of World War II. However, the VFW concluded that the portion titled *The Atomic Bomb* was to be the vehicle the Smithsonian would use to make the case that nuclear weapons should never be used and that America was absolutely wrong in doing so. They were to make their case by presenting the results of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the victim's viewpoint.

Second, just what real role did Dr. Martin Harwit play as a revisionist historian or as an opponent of atomic weapons? It is a fact that he was formerly a professor

of Astronomy at Cornell University and had been Director of the National Air and Space Museum since 1987. It is also true that while serving in the U.S. Army from 1955 to 1957, Dr. Harwit was assigned to work on nuclear weapons testing at Eniwetok and Bikini. Dr. Harwit had said that this experience inevitably influenced his thoughts about the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Knowing this, was Dr. Harwit in charge or was he being used as a front-man for someone else's agenda? Also, knowing Dr. Harwit's views, why was he given this exhibit mission in the first place and subsequently allowed to struggle with four or five revised scripts?

Third, what roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Tom Crouch? Both were associated with the National Air and Space Museum and the first *Enola Gay* script which was never shown to any veterans service organization but was reviewed by unknown parties in Japan. Another facet to this question is, what was the managerial role of the Chairman Tom Crouch to the Director, Martin Harwit?

Fourth and last, why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take a more immediate and decisive position earlier in this controversy? In all fairness, we know that Dr. Heyman joined the Smithsonian in September of 1994; however, he certainly should have been aware of the on-going *Enola Gay* controversy if only by reading newspaper editorials and surely by receiving information from his Under Secretary, Ms. Constance Newman, who was present for most of the *Enola Gay* campaign. While it is a fact that Dr. Heyman was previously a law professor and chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, he is no stranger to power and politics of Washington, DC. He was once counselor to Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of the Interior. It is also a fact that Secretary Heyman received congressional criticism beginning in mid-December 1994 from members of the House of Representatives, to include Sam Johnson, Peter Blute, Duncan Hunter, and Bob Dornan among others. Then, on January 19, 1995, Congressman Sam Johnson and Peter Blute issued a press release that was extremely critical of the National Air and Space Museum's attempt to revise previously agreed upon American casualty estimates for a land invasion of Japan. The following day, January 20, 1995, the Air Force Association issued their own press release that also eloquently summarized the VFW's position by stating:

We [the Air Force Association] have continued our discussions with senior Smithsonian officials in the hope that the *Enola Gay* exhibit could be salvaged. We had been assured that no unilateral actions would be taken by curators and officials of the National Air and Space Museum, in whom we lost faith long ago. It now appears that, on the side and behind the scenes, the curators are still working their political agenda. This is unacceptable. Museum officials have failed in their stewardship and responsibilities.

Apparently, Dr. Heyman took this statement and the congressional criticism to heart and 10 days later cancelled the exhibit. This action, in the VFW's opinion, was not justified when we recall the expended time and effort and the fact the Air and Space Museum received about \$13 million in 1994 from Congress. Certainly all this money didn't go into the *Enola Gay* fiasco, but for \$13 million we do expect first-class management that as a minimum has an objective in mind and a timetable to meet deadlines and make decisions. This brings us full circle for the requirement to have Congress conduct an inquiry into how and why this debacle was ever allowed to happen in the first place.

This concludes the VFW's formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond to any questions you or the committee members may have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Manhan, I shall ask those questions next week. We will get their answers on the record.

Mr. MANHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just make a few comments and turn the questioning over to my colleague, the former chairman. We have lived through this process together. I appreciate the

restraint that you gentlemen have used with regard to the problems we have had on this exhibit with the Smithsonian.

First let me ask you, General Sweeney, were you contacted by any of the historians at the Smithsonian with regard to your participation in these historic flights before it became a controversy publicly?

General SWEENEY. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you learned about it first through a publication, the Air Force Association's publication?

General SWEENEY. Yes, when I first learned—

The CHAIRMAN. We need your microphone, General.

Senator FORD. We are frugal. We do not have one for everybody.

[Laughter.]

General SWEENEY. Your question was, I first learned about it through a publication, the Air Force Association publication, the Air Force Magazine, which is true. Mr. Correll wrote an article in there and just sent signals to my eyes when the Smithsonian is purported—and I am sure it did say that the script said—implied—I think said that we were trying to destroy another nation's culture and that we were an imperialistic Nation.

Now to the latter I say I do not think we wanted any of their territory or any other territory in Asia. I do not think we were setting up satellites in other parts of the world or that we were fighting for that reason.

Then as to the culture, we certainly were not trying to do anything with their culture. We were trying to preserve it and not destroy it. We were just trying to get our men home; get the war over with and get our men home. I must suggest to you and remind perhaps everybody that on the original list of targets for the nuclear weapons, Kyoto somehow or other appeared on there. Secretary Stimson struck that immediately because that is considered to be the seat of Japanese culture, religious culture, or whatever you want to call it. So Secretary Stimson struck that from the list immediately.

Also, every bomber pilot in the 20th Air Force in the theater in the Pacific had orders not to ever bomb the Imperial Palace, even as a target of opportunity. Certainly we could have wiped out the Imperial Palace—I do not mean our group, but some group could very easily have wiped out the Imperial Palace if we were trying to destroy their culture. Secretary Stimson said no, never; no pilot will ever, no crew will ever go near that Imperial Palace.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You raise a very interesting point for me. I was on the Burma Road between Chongqing and Xian taking a convoy of gas trucks up to Chengdu which was a new base to fly B-29's out of. We were preparing to have an assault on Japan flying in from the west. I know full well the impact of the word,