

important, in my view, that all of the exhibits are factually correct and properly reflect the values that this great country is based upon. Most importantly, museums have an incredible responsibility to our nation's children. Our national museums must, at the very least, surround and teach them, I believe, what is good about America.

I am proud to say that after working with Secretary Heyman and the other regents, I am confident and excited about the prospects for this great institution in the future. We recognize the financing problems and we are out along with the Secretary, to find some private funding to help us get over the hump. We are on the path to restoring the Smithsonian to its once prominent state and we, as regents, have a solemn trust to the nation to do that, and I am very honored to be a part of it.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having these hearings, and allowing me to participate. I would be happy to answer some of your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are proud, too, that you are there. I am delighted to have your statement. We have found the same relationship with the Secretary, and I hope that we can put this issue behind us.

Do you have any questions?

Senator FORD. I have no questions for the Congressman. We do thank you for being here and thank you for your fine efforts.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for allowing me to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, let me tell you that the legal advisor to the Senate has just sent me word, through my staff, that I am incorrect. Members of Congress take an oath to support the President of the United States, but they do not take an oath to testify truthfully at every instance.

So, do you swear that the testimony you have just given is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Our next witness is Dr. Edward Linenthal. Professor, you are going to be the first one to do this before us officially.

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are happy to have your statement, Professor, please proceed.

TESTIMONY OF EDWARD T. LINENTHAL, PROFESSOR OF RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-OSHKOSH, OSHKOSH, WISCONSIN

Mr. LINENTHAL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am very pleased to be here this morning.

I served on the advisory committee for the National Air and Space Museum's proposed exhibit, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" because of my engagement with a number of controversial historic sites and issues, particularly the changing interpretation of the Little Big Horn Battlefield National Monument, my experience working at the U.S.S. Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor during the 50th anniversary events, and a recently published book on the creation of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

The Little Big Horn is one of the great success stories of American public history, as visitors learn that different, often clashing, stories can be told at a historic site and that these clashing voices deepen rather than impoverish our understanding of the events of 1876. At Pearl Harbor and at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I felt the power of the commemorative voice which speaks with the authority of the witness, "I was there. I know what happened because I saw it and felt it." As a historian, part of my obligation is to attend to this voice, to listen carefully in this instance to Pearl Harbor veterans and Holocaust survivors.

Scholars, including museum professionals, are obliged to provide a comprehensive and balanced rendering of the human experience. Frequently, there is a tension between the commemorative voice and the historical voice, which seeks to discern motives, understand actions, and discuss consequences that were impossible to analyze during the event itself. It is a voice that to some can feel condescending, even when no condescension is intended. It can feel detached, even when those who speak out of this voice view their work as a way to deepen our understanding of an event.

The National Air and Space Museum tried, unsuccessfully, to represent both these perspectives in one exhibit. In hindsight, there were too many complicating factors — the presence of what many considered a sacred relic, the *Enola Gay* itself; the expectations of many that 50th anniversary events should privilege the commemorative perspective; the strongly held and sometimes irreconcilable belief about the use of atomic weapons; and fundamental disagreements about the function of the National Air and Space Museum. Should it be a place for uncritical celebration of technological prowess, or should it inform the public about the economic, social, and political context of the museum's artifacts? In my opinion, it is certainly not "gratuitous social commentary," as some have charged, that the museum, for example, reminds visitors that the V-2 rocket is more than a "milestone in the progress of rocket technology," what an old label read. Rather, that thousands of concentration camp prisoners died building it, and that it "killed 7,000 people and terrorized millions."

The museum tried to balance what historian John Dower has called the heroic and tragic narrative of the Bomb. Veterans and

many others envisioned and expected an exhibit that portrayed the use of the Bomb as the culmination of the Pacific war, saving many lives. The appropriate historical context was the pre-Bomb horror of the Pacific war. The commemorative message was, "remember what we did and what it cost." The tragic narrative, clearly dominant in the museum's exhibition, sought to freeze a moment widely considered a turning point in history, in much the way the Holocaust Museum froze an event for examination. While acknowledging the Bomb's role in ending the war, one appropriate historical context in this tragic narrative was the post-war legacy of the nuclear arms race, and a host of controversial issues that had occupied historians for 50 years. The commemorative message was "never again." Historians' perspective on the Bomb emerge out of both of these stories. Some emphasize the fact that the Bomb ended the war and view it as a positive act. Others see it also as the first act of the Cold War and view it much more ambivalently.

The first script, which was just that, a draft, understood by its creators to be subject to revision and ensuing consultations, became a lightning rod for criticism. In the spring and summer of 1994, there was thoughtful criticism from military historians, including those of another review body appointed by Martin Harwit, the "Tiger Team," which included several Air Force veterans and was chaired by retired Air Force Brigadier General William Constantine. There were several major concerns: one, that its sections about historical controversies were too speculative and, for some, tendentious; two, that a much fuller presentation of the Pacific war was necessary in order to help visitors appreciate the decision to drop the Bomb; and three, that there was an imbalance in the script because of this lack of context, evident in many more photographs of Japanese Bomb victims than American combat casualties, an imbalance that fostered forgetfulness of the Japanese as perpetrators of barbaric acts in the war, and remember them only as victims of the Bomb.

Over the summer of 1994, the script underwent substantial changes. For example, of the 42 specific recommendations of the Tiger Team, 30 were fully implemented, 7 were partially implemented, 5 were not. Other military historians were also consulted, and their advice taken seriously. On July 14, 1994, retired Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, the Director for Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also a professional historian, wrote Dr. Alfred Goldberg, historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Substantial revisions have been made . . . Some attempt has been made to address virtually every criticism raised at the April 13 meeting between Joint History and Service historians and Smithsonian curators, although in some cases the fixes have been minor." Several months later, on September 19, 1994, Alfred Goldberg wrote, "The first three sections of this draft should dispose of most of the negative criticism of the first two drafts. They

present an informed and balanced picture of events. The issue of racism, strategic bombing policy, decision to drop the bomb, and invasion plans and casualties, are handled with acceptable objectivity. The section on the effect of the atomic bombs will no doubt continue to draw critical comment as being too long, too detailed, and too sympathetic to the Japanese, but the exhibit would be incomplete and much less meaningful without it." Despite these changes, media criticism and the campaign organized by the Air Force Association intensified.

Media coverage of this issue has been distressingly irresponsible. The museum and curators were accused of anti-American impulses, of creating a script that exhibited disregard for veterans. Interestingly, however, the museum's strongest critic, the Air Force Association, noted early on that the first script treated the men of the 509th, "extensively and with respect." Let me offer one example of the way the press poisoned the debate. The Wall Street Journal spoke of the "oozing romanticism with which the . . . show's writers describe the kamikaze pilots . . . These were, the script elegiacally relates, 'youths, their bodies overflowing with life.'" The Journal has taken a quote from a kamikaze pilot in the script and implied that these are the curators' words. The curators included this quote to provide, they commented, "insight into [the kamikaze's] suicidal fanaticism, which many Americans would otherwise find incomprehensible." Ken Ringle of The Washington Post quoted the Journal's paragraphs, repeating for his readers the false accusation.

As script after script deleted material about historical controversies regarding the decision to drop the bomb, added photographs of mushroom clouds and structural damage, and removed most photographs of dead Japanese, historians and peace activists met with museum officials to argue for what they believed should be restored or newly incorporated. The scripts were a kind of Rorschach test. People were concerned with different questions, paid attention to different "facts," and interpreted the same facts differently. In the end, everyone believed their history had been "stolen," resulting either in a "revisionist" exhibit or in one showing a disregard for the complexity and irony of history.

Reaction to the exhibit remains troubling in many respects. Some critics folded this exhibit into the culture wars, into an anti-intellectual attack, arguing that elite historians had "stolen" the "people's" history, and that the museum had fallen victim to the delusions of "revisionism." This argument conveniently ignores the fact that historians have opened up American history to the voices of many different Americans. It also seeks to portray "revisionism" as a morally dubious activity, akin to the practices of Holocaust deniers (formerly called Holocaust revisionists). And yet, is it not the job of historians to continually reconstruct the past in great detail, to continually revise our

interpretations of the past according to new research and new insight? Are we not pleased when Ken Burns deepens and broadens, therefore revises, our understanding of the Civil War or the history of baseball when he allows so many forgotten people to speak? Do we not see this as an act of historical enrichment, reminding us of the fact that history is never as simple as it seems, but as complex, ironic, and therefore endlessly fascinating?

It was also troubling that our advisory committee and the museum failed to be more sensitive to the passions aroused by this story, troubling that the museum failed to respond publicly to the media caricature of script and curatorial motive, and troubling that the museum was willing to enter into negotiations with the American Legion, which had virtual veto power over the content of the exhibit. Museums, particularly public museums, have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of various groups in the shaping of public exhibitions, but the integrity of the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum exhibit, that seeks careful rendition of the past, is threatened when any interest group becomes an arbiter of public history.

In recent years, many museums have succeeded in engaging visitors in conversation about controversial issues in order to help fill the much lamented "naked public square" in American life. The cancellation of this exhibit sets a chilling and dangerous precedent, if the message is that only "officially" sanctioned history is acceptable. With all due respect to Representative Peter Blute of Massachusetts, I am troubled by his comment about the *Enola Gay* exhibit. He said, "I don't want 16-year-olds walking out of there thinking badly of the U.S." Surely Representative Blute would agree that the presentation of history is not to function as therapy, used to puff up the self-esteem of individuals or nations. Surely Representative Blute would object to the very idea that there should be a patriotic litmus test for a public museum in the Nation's Capital, or that young people should not be confronted with the complexities of history. I am sure that Representative Blute would never mean to imply that such a test could lead to opposition for appropriated funds for the Holocaust Museum. There, visitors learned that Americans encountered and liberated the camps and many Holocaust survivors found a home in America. They also learn, however, about official anti-Semitism that kept thousands of European Jews from legally emigrating to this country. They learn that the S.S. *Saint Louis* was turned away from American shores in 1939, resulting in the deaths of many passengers in the Holocaust. At that museum, visitors are judged to be mature enough to be able to confront a complex story. Surely they had the ability to do the same at the National Air and Space Museum.

Unlike totalitarian countries, we never want to give fuel to the impulse to sanitize history, to turn away from engaging our

past in all of its complexity. This would be anathema to the democratic principles we all hold sacred. Surely, we can find ways to both honor the commemorative voice and respect the historical voice as we continue to create public history exhibits designed to both inspire and challenge.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I noticed that two of our colleagues have arrived. Senator Cochran is also a member of the Smithsonian Board. Do you have a statement, Senator?

Senator COCHRAN. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner, do you have a statement?

Senator WARNER. I have one I would like to insert in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

I would like to thank the chairman for holding this very important hearing.

As a member of the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents during the period in which the *Enola Gay* exhibit controversy developed, I worked closely with the Institution and with various military groups as they strove to resolve their differences. Progress was being made until mid-January of this year when discussions between the parties broke down and The American Legion called for the cancellation of the planned exhibit.

Following that, on January 20, 1995, Senator Dole and I wrote to Chairman Stevens requesting hearings focused on the controversy surrounding the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Ten days later, on January 30, 1995, Smithsonian Secretary Heyman announced that the planned exhibit had been cancelled and replaced with a smaller display featuring the forward section of the *Enola Gay* and a limited script.

The cancellation of the exhibit and all of the controversy surrounding it has, unfortunately, damaged the Smithsonian Institution's reputation. We now have a responsibility to the American people to ensure that such an incident never occurs again. We must then put this unfortunate chapter behind us and look to the future.

The Smithsonian Institution is a national treasure that belongs to us all. We must address the mistakes that were made, correct them and then immediately focus our attention on how we can all work together to strengthen the Institution. To do otherwise would be a disservice to all Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. No opening statement, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you are writing a history on this controversy. Is that right?

Mr. LINENTHAL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. A book on this whole subject we are exploring?

Mr. LINENTHAL. My own contribution will be a chapter of the history of this controversy in a book of essays that will explore other museum controversies, but will focus on the *Enola Gay* exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that when the Smithsonian prepares an exhibit on an event in military history that military

historians and the records of the Department of Defense ought to be consulted?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I think that in the creation of any public history exhibit, a wide variety of voices, particularly of people who are invested in the story, should be consulted. I have wondered, this is of course a hypothetical question, and it is a different museum so it is hard to draw precise analogies, but at the Holocaust Museum, there was a content committee made up of museum people, historians, and Holocaust survivors. That content committee had something to do with evaluating the script, making suggestions.

I have wondered, in retrospect, given the volatile nature of this story, whether some kind of a content committee for this exhibit might, in fact, have allayed some of the anger of veterans and others who felt that their voices were not a part of this originally, and that they did not own the story in the ways that they wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, do you believe that the committee that met on the Holocaust should have included Nazis?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that this group, who prepared this exhibit, should have gone to Japan to consult with Japanese veterans before they consulted with American veterans?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not know that that is the case, Senator. I know that the museum went to Japan on several occasions and, from the materials that I have seen from the Smithsonian—and I still have documents to go through, of course—the materials that I have seen, the Smithsonian went there to consult with the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and several museums about artifacts. I am not aware of consultation with Japanese veterans.

I do know, as well, that there were some discussions with Japanese victims. I also know, and you perhaps have the dates of this, that early on in this process, the men of the 509th were, in fact, a part of this process as well.

The CHAIRMAN. The information we have is that military historians were not consulted until the summer of 1994. In your history, do you know how many scripts were actually prepared on this exhibit?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have a number of scripts in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me how many?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Quite a few. I have six or seven in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked for all of them to be delivered to this committee. I hope that we have the same scripts that you have.

You stated that the American Legion had veto power over the context.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The content.

The CHAIRMAN. The content. I thought you meant content and context of this exhibition. If that is so, why did it take so many

drafts before they got to the point that it reflected any part of their opinion?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well, the American Legion was asked by the Smithsonian to come in rather late in this game. I think, frankly, that given what very distinguished military historians in Washington said about two of the earlier scripts—particularly I believe it was August of 1994—that that script was one that displayed, as Alfred Goldberg and David Armstrong said, an acceptable balance that included many voices.

By the time the American Legion became involved, and they were asked to become involved, so it was at that point something they were willing to do, the public situation was, as you know, the controversy had erupted already. I simply think that while museums must take great care to include a variety of voices in the creation of scripts so that various people are engaged in and own the story in various ways, in situations of duress, when any interest group—whether it be the American Legion or the Fellowship of Reconciliation—are in positions to dictate what goes in scripts, that that is a bad precedent set.

So here I am not simply picking on the American Legion. I would feel the same way were it any group with a particular agenda telling a public museum what should and should not be in an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. One should not get too personal about these things, but I remember when I was a high school student in Senator Feinstein's beautiful state, that right after Pearl Harbor we lost 40 percent of the students in our high school because they were Japanese. They were my good friends. Those of us who lived at that time were able to draw a distinction between how we felt about the Japanese military and how we felt about Japanese people.

Do you think this exhibit demonstrated that feeling at the time, which was not anti-Japanese, but anti-Japanese military?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I am not entirely sure that that was the case as the war went on.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about this exhibit. Do you think it exhibited the feeling in the United States at the time, of just total antipathy towards those who controlled Japan, as compared to the Japanese people, per se?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well there were, in the first script, certainly statements about the activities of the Japanese in China and their activities toward American prisoners of war. I think, speaking personally, that the issue of context, that since so many Americans—especially younger people, the Smithsonian found out—did not have the proper context into which to put this story, the idea of placing this in the wider context of the Pacific war was, in fact, a wise one. And the Smithsonian moved, I think, relatively quickly to do that. So I think that was very wise.

As I said, working out of the tragic narrative of the bomb, the Smithsonian tried to show what the bomb did on the ground.

Many people thought that this helped kind of "misremember" this—that the Japanese were being remembered only as victims.

The way I read that part of the script, with pictures of the dead Japanese, it did not make me misremember the war. I had no trouble remembering what the Japanese did in China, at the rape of Nanking, or the beheading of Australian prisoners of war, the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war. I saw those photographs as representing really the civilian victims of World War II throughout the theaters, and also in some ways the first victims of the nuclear age.

So that is very much how I read those.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Tiger Team?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I was not a member of the Tiger Team.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many times the Tiger Team met?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I have the Tiger Team's reports. I do not know how many times they met.

The CHAIRMAN. If I told you I was advised that the advisory board only met once, and that six of the nine members attended, no notes were taken, and no report was ever issued, could you question that in terms of your history?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I could, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what your history shows?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have a history of what the Tiger Team did. There's a large report that the National Air and Space Museum has, that I have in my files, that shows what the Tiger Team did, and what the various issues were that the Tiger Team took up, what issues were negotiated between the museum and the members of the Tiger Team. So I do have that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to monopolize this. I will just ask you two more questions. Have you read Manchester's "Goodbye Darkness"?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you question his judgment of history, as one who participated in it?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not question—Senator, I was asked at the 50th anniversary ceremonies at Pearl Harbor, there was a conference in Honolulu on the legacy of Pearl Harbor, in which I participated. And after I was done with my talk, which was a history of the changing interpretation of the U.S.S. Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor, the son of a survivor of the Bataan Death March asked me a question from the audience, "What would you tell my father about reconciling with the Japanese?"

I said to him what I hope I would be wise enough to say and have, in fact, responded to Holocaust survivors—that there are some things you do not comment on out of human decency. That I had no business telling someone who had survived the Bataan Death March anything about reconciliation with the Japanese.

I have, as a member of the advisory board, had people say that I had forgotten who were the good guys and the bad guys

in World War II. When I was writing my history of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, I walked on the ashes of my family members at the death camp at Auschwitz and Buchenwald. My father was a doctor during the war who helped work on quinine, to develop medicine for malaria that saved many lives.

I have absolutely no problem remembering what was at stake at World War II and what would have happened had the darkness descended.

I think that historians and people like William Manchester and yourself, who were involved in this and bring the feel and texture of history, both of those voices are necessary. And it is my moral obligation as a historian to pay attention to those voices, to listen to those voices; and also my obligation as a historian to say that there is a sense of perspective and a sense of insight that can be gained years after working in archives, working with materials from a distance.

The history without either one of those voices is incomplete and shallow.

The CHAIRMAN. My last question, and then I will be happy to yield, is this. We are holding this hearing to determine how we can be assured that these events cannot happen again. We want to protect the Smithsonian from the loss of support, as I said.

We were not consulted on the other exhibits I mentioned to you. All of them caused substantial controversy. When we got notice of this proposed exhibit, Senator Ford and I, and several others here, joined together and asked the Smithsonian to review it and give us information about it. That request was literally ignored.

What would you do to this management system to assure that the interests whom you indicate should have been consulted, are in fact consulted. Veterans were not consulted until this thing went off the wall. Military historians were not consulted until it was a matter of substantial public controversy. Congress was not consulted until we had veterans groups and a lot of other groups banging at our door.

Now, we are responsible for oversight of this institution. What would you do to the system to assure that, as you say, these people are properly consulted and their viewpoints are taken into consideration? I would add, as a footnote to this, that if this exhibit had not been interrupted, it would have hit the public right about the time that we were commemorating the victory of the United States after 50 years. If it resounded throughout the whole United States community the way it did within the small community that did get hold of it, I think the Smithsonian would have faced overwhelming opposition to its even continuing in existence.

What would you do to change this management scheme?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Let me say first off, I think that there were veterans, I think 20th Air Force and men of the 509th, were

consulted about this. I do not know the details of that consultation. Perhaps Secretary Heyman and certainly Martin Harwit and Tom Crouch who will testify later today can say something about that.

I also will not be pompous enough to say what I would do were I in charge of a museum. However, after having written the history of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and appreciated very much the tremendous difficulties and volatility of placing a memory like that on American soil, and all of the issues of location and representation that come up, and the sensitivity with with Holocaust survivors looked at the story, there was a balance. And often many clashes, enduring and bitter clashes, between Holocaust survivors, museum professionals, and historians that were often not a question of right or wrong but a question of sensibility.

Should women's hair from Auschwitz be displayed in the permanent exhibition? Well, for a historian like myself and for museum people, the clear answer was yes. This showed one of the revolutionary aspects of the Holocaust, that the Nazis mined the bodies of their victims for insulation in submarines, socks for the Wehrmacht. This is what hair was used for, and the Russians found thousands of kilos of it in Auschwitz.

The museum brought some of that hair to Washington when they were collecting artifacts, and wanted to put it in the permanent exhibition. As a historian, it seemed clear to me that this was important and dramatic and part of the pedagogical importance of the museum.

Some survivors on the content committee objected bitterly on the grounds that this simply was wrong to do. One woman said, on the committee, a survivor, this could be my mother. You cannot display my mother at the museum. I think wisely, Shaike Weinberg, the director of the museum, left the hair out of the permanent exhibition.

Now when I talk about this in the book, and also when I lecture about the museum, people say was this a right decision or a wrong decision? It was a decision of honoring a certain kind of sensibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But I do not see that sensibility in this at all, Professor. I hope you write the history, in part at least, in the way that the veterans see it because we veterans were ignored when we raised the question here in the Congress. And as far as I can see, the veterans organizations were ignored until we got into it even further.

Mr. LINENTHAL. I think that in any museum, particularly in a public museum, particularly in the Nation's Capital, and particularly in a museum whose very purpose is contested, one has to be very careful about the inclusion of many voices in the creation of the exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to go on some other people. Senator Ford?

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was enjoying the questions and response of the professor.

Several weeks ago I had a very emotional moment. That emotional moment was a statement made by Senator Bumpers from Arkansas relating to the 50th anniversary of the Marines. Senator Heflin stood; he was wounded. We had Senator Inouye, who lost an arm. We had Senator Dole, who was injured seriously, and others. Looking around that Senate chamber and having a memory of World War II and what transpired there, I knew that the ability to relate that history to this institution was dwindling.

I thought to myself, my children will understand it because I could relate it to them. My grandchildren can understand it some, because I can relate it to them. They are more of the Vietnam era. We are spending lots of money in my home town to put in a museum. I thought if they would pattern it after the Smithsonian as best they could, my home town folks would be well served.

Then I listened to your statement here this morning, Professor, and I just want to tell you I respectfully disagree. I appreciate your perspective, but I respectfully disagree with your conclusion that Congressman Blute's concerns are misplaced. I think it is appropriate that a 16-year-old leave this exhibit, or would have left this exhibit, or any other exhibit as a matter of fact, understanding the full ramifications of the war, but still somehow feeling good about the role that the United States played in ending the war.

That is precisely the role of the Smithsonian management, I think, to balance the perspectives but remember that this is our history. We mix it all up, I guess, but it is our history as we see it. When you start mixing in other countries' perspectives and so forth, I wonder. I want our citizens to have it all, because history is awfully important, and those who opposed war the most are those who served.

I just wanted to add that, too, because I saw that in the next 2 years we will lose the distinguished Senator from Alabama as a member of the United States Senate. Senator Heflin has announced that he will not seek reelection, so there is someone with a valuable institutional memory that we will lose.

We all have our problems, and there has to be a final decision. So what we are trying to do here today is to be of assistance when that final decision is made, so that it will meet the standards that all of us would like to have as it relates to history.

But as I say, I appreciate your position. I regret that I must disagree with it, or disagree with your conclusions, as you agreed with something and then you said that the decision made at the Holocaust Museum was the proper one. We all have to make a decision, and we have been used to that around here. Sometimes they are good and sometimes they are bad, and we pray that they are all good.

So I thank you for a very interesting statement this morning. I enjoyed it. I understand it, I think. I understand where you are coming from. Let us hope that we can all lay these things out on the table and that the ultimate decision is the right one. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. I just find myself interested in the discussion. Seeing the model for the Holocaust Museum I think back to the World War II days. I came back myself in a hospital ship sick, not wounded. I remember my feelings when I heard that the bomb went off. I happened to be on Pennsylvania Avenue and right opposite the White House by coincidence, and wondered if we, too, might expect the same.

I have no strong view one way or the other. I think you are doing the best you can, and I wish you well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cochran?

Senator COCHRAN. Professor, I am curious. Who selected you to be on the Advisory Board of the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I was asked by Martin Harwit. I had come to know one of the curators who I had consulted with when I was writing my book on the Holocaust Museum, because I was interested in the way the museum presented the bombing of Auschwitz and the interpretation of that in the Holocaust Museum. So I talked with one of the curators who had, in fact, had a panel on this at the National Air and Space Museum.

After I got to know him some, and also Martin Harwit a little bit, I was asked, given my work on some of these other controversial historic sites, to be on the advisory committee and I said yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Had you served on any other advisory boards for the Smithsonian Museums before?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I have not. I have done some consulting work with the National Park Service in training sessions for park historians and managers on how to interpret controversial historic sites.

Senator COCHRAN. I am interested in the parallel that you seem to draw between the victims of the Holocaust in Europe and the victims of the holocaust in Japan. To you there is a parallel, is there not?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not know that I would draw a direct parallel. I guess the parallel I was trying to draw was how the Holocaust Museum had to struggle and deal with what I have called these different voices, all of whom are passionately involved in the story.

Senator COCHRAN. And all of whom were victims. You were talking about the victims, were you not, in the Holocaust Museum? The victims of the mass murder.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The Holocaust Museum, in fact, one of the interesting interpretive dilemmas they had was that many of the survivors really did not want a Nazi presence in the permanent

exhibition at all. What that did was to leave the permanent exhibition as if the Jews were going to the death by themselves. There were no—

Senator COCHRAN. Did you come to conclude that the perpetrators of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were on a parallel with Nazi Germany?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, absolutely not. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. That thought would never enter my mind.

Senator COCHRAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The thought would never enter my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I look at this issue from two perspectives, one personal. I enlisted in World War II just following the Battle of the Bulge with a great many others from my high school class. Given at that time, there was such uncertainty on both fronts of the future of our military campaigns and there was a need to have a very heavy influx of young people at that time.

Of course, in the course of events in 1945, the spring of 1945, hostilities ceased both in Europe and eventually in Japan. But my particular group of naval persons were headed into the invasion of Japan. We were explicitly trained for that invasion. One of the most controversial features of this regrettable chapter was the level of casualties that were likely to be shouldered by the American public and other allies as a consequence of a full scale invasion of Japan.

Did you work on that issue? And were you able to reconcile some of the differing views?

Mr. LINENTHAL. On the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

Senator WARNER. Yes, on the casualty levels.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Yes. I will tell you how I feel about the casualty issue, which I think is a very regrettable controversy in this whole thing. It seems to me that the arguments over the number of casualties is close to obscene. That if the number of casualties would have been very low, an American president still would have been justified in deciding to use the bomb. It does not matter whether it is 10,000 or 800,000 or 350,000. These arguments became symbolic of the much larger struggle that was going on over the exhibit and the fact that there were historical correctives made and these numbers were seen to be very important by certain people.

I think this is not a happy story. I am quite comfortable myself believing that everybody knew that there would be casualties, that the casualties would be high, and a specific number was not terribly important. These casualty numbers, when we deal with these volatile historical issues, become icons in themselves.

When the great Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg lowered the figures slightly in his magisterial work in 1961, "The Destruction of the European Jews", from 6 million to I think he said 5.1

million, he was virtually called a Holocaust denier because he had challenged the sacred figure.

Chinese and Japanese are involved in bitter debates over the numbers of deaths in Nanking. I think there the Chinese say anything less than 300,000—

Senator WARNER. Without going into all that detail, there is no doubt that the potential casualties by the U.S. and our allies would have been very, very high.

Mr. LINENTHAL. [Nodding affirmatively.]

Senator WARNER. And it is no doubt that that invasion did not take place as a direct consequence of the utilization of this weapons system by President Truman.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Certainly one of the hot buttons in the exhibit were the historical controversy panels in section 200, I believe. And yet, even in the first script, if one looks at what the curators said in their ultimate judgment about these things, they basically say many historians believe that the primary judgment had to do with ending the war and saving lives, but that there were a number of subsidiary issues here as well.

I think that the casualty issue became one, again, in which veterans saw that the museum was trying to take away their story. And I do not think the museum meant to do that at all.

Senator WARNER. One other facet of this, we have in the Rotunda of the United States Capitol today, a flag symbolizing America's great concern for POW's. There was much written with regard to the potential destruction of those lives in those camps if that invasion had taken place. Did you do any research to verify that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have read accounts in oral histories of World War II about that, that a number of people in camps said that we were told or we knew that the minute the invasion took place we were going to die. So yes, I have read that, indeed.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness and I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As a footnote to history, I flew on the first plane into Peking after World War II and was there when the Doolittle flyers came out of their prison camp. I believe almost every one of them said to us if that bomb had not dropped, they would have been killed.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Senator Stevens, it has occurred to me, in response to one of your earlier questions about the veterans' voice in this exhibit. Everyone I have talked to who has seen the final film, which was a very short film about the men of the 509th talking about their own stories, that will now not be a part of the exhibit, has said it was an absolutely stunning and powerful film.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it will be a part of the exhibit.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Not the old one, I understand. Perhaps I am mistaken. So that was one way that the museum did try certainly to include the veterans' voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein?

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find this a very, very challenging discussion.

When I was the mayor of San Francisco, I had a small incident somewhat similar. This leads to the question. It was when we were building a convention center. A bust of my predecessor, who had been assassinated, was selected. It was done by a very famous contemporary sculptor by the name of Arneson. But the bust in itself had editorial comment. It had blood on it, "Twinkies defense," epithets, et cetera. A firestorm developed.

I grappled with that firestorm, and I elected to have the Art Commission remove the bust from the convention center with the view that it was appropriate for a private collection or a private museum, but this was a taxpayer supported convention center, and with it came some different values.

That is really what I want to talk to you about for a moment, Professor. It seems to me that where institutions get into these troubles is where there is opinion, interpretation, and editorial comment. You mentioned in your last statement, and I quote, "What the curator said, in his ultimate judgment."

My question to you is, is it really the role to interpret history, rather than just simply to put forward historical facts based on the validity of the fact and the historical value? It seems to me that I would look at a curator to determine historic value and validity of that value, but not to interpret, not for their editorial comment. It seems to me in public facilities we have to begin to grapple with that, because we are seeing more and more. Whether it is NEA moneys for a Mapplethorpe, or this situation, or my little situation back there, the public role of a museum is a different thing than the private role.

I wonder if you would comment on that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Certainly. It is an interesting question and deals with a number of things, the role of history, the relation of fact and interpretation, curatorial responsibility and freedom.

First of all, Senator, I think there are certainly things that we could consider incontrovertible fact. That Paul Tibbets piloted the *Enola Gay* is an incontrovertible fact. When you begin to put any story into a narrative of any kind, you are already doing interpretation. Do you select a heroic narrative of the bomb? Do you select the tragic narrative?

At the Holocaust Museum, what narrative do you pick? Does it focus on the victim's stories? Does it focus on the process of extermination? There is already interpretive work going on. Any time you ask, I think, the meaning of events, you are already into the realm that all historians practice, and that is interpretive history.

The question is whether the Smithsonian is a university in which curators have the same kind of freedom, say that I do, to write a book? Whether there is a different kind of responsibility in a public exhibition funded by public monies. And perhaps there is a different kind of code. Yes, perhaps realistically that is the case. Perhaps in controversial historical exhibits, I think the curatorial voice is very important and there needs to be a scholarly freedom. Perhaps as part of the exhibits that are controversial, the history of the exhibit itself should become part of the exhibit so that various voices are represented.

Perhaps there needs to be a curatorial code of ethics. Now I do not think the curators did anything wrong in this exhibit. I think all of us on the advisory committee were insensitive to the nature of the 50th, to the passions that were held, and that is part of this. So that is one response to that. Curators, museums have responsibilities to the public the same way I, when I write my books, have responsibilities to the materials. All history is, in many ways, interpretive. It is put into a narrative, into a framework of meaning.

When you are working in a public museum, obviously you must be very sensitive to the inclusion of many voices in the creation of this.

Senator FEINSTEIN. But I think, you know I have seen history change. I was a history major. In the days when I studied history the text, for example, on American diplomatic history by a very famous professor by the name of T.A. Bailey, was essentially a recitation of fact, leaving the reader to draw their own analysis. Now what you see is a writer's interpretation of fact, which is different.

I think in a sense what happened with the *Enola Gay* was interpretation. People really reacted to that interpretation in a very violent way. I wonder about the wisdom in presenting any interpretation.

Mr. LINENTHAL. I understand. The example that I used in my presentation this morning, how do you present the V-2 in the National Air and Space Museum? You can either frame it, as the Air and Space Museum did, in a section on civilian space technology and talk about booster rockets and how it led to the evolution of booster rockets. Well, that is a way of talking about the V-2 that deals with certain kinds of facts.

The way the museum now displays it, which I think is eminently more responsible, is to put it into the context that the V-2 was a horrendous weapon used by Nazi's. That many more concentration camp prisoners died building it than died at the other end. Those are also facts about the V-2.

I also think, in response to several comments, that controversy over volatile stories is, in many ways, inevitable. We could easily memorialize and remember what we do not really care about. Could you create a U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum without a certain level of controversy because of the passionate

engagement? Was there a way to create an exhibit on the dropping of the atomic bomb and the end of the war without certain kinds of controversies? Probably not.

I suppose this is another issue, whether controversy is altogether a negative thing. I know that, Senator Stevens, you were a strong opponent of the "West as America" show, and I have, in the museum world, interesting friends some of whom detested the show, that it was preachy and tendentious and told people what they had to think now about these works, as opposed to how they were presented before; others who thought it was stimulating and important.

From my perspective, what was more important than either of those voices, was the very fruitful discussion that went on in the public about history, about the history of the American West, about how we are to look at it. That that, in a sense, was a kind of unintended, positive outcome of what was a very controversial museum exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished, Senator?

Senator FEINSTEIN. I am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ford, did you have another question?

Senator FORD. I just wanted to make a comment and follow up on my friend's question and the position she was in. It seems the professor now is writing a chapter as it relates to this controversy. Whoever reads it is going to have his interpretation of who the bad guys are and who the good guys are, who wore the black hats and who wore the white hats. I think I have got a pretty good idea from listening to your comments this morning who the white hats are going to be and who the black hats are going to be.

Your interpretation of this incident is going to be read by a lot of people, and they are going to believe it because it is the only one they have read. I understand what the distinguished Senator from California is saying. I could almost write it down on a piece of paper and put it in an envelope and seal it and, from your comments this morning, know what the outcome and your interpretation is going to be.

I hope I am wrong, but I do not think so. So I just want to let you know that is part of the problem that the distinguished Senator has brought out. You start interpreting what happened here from all the reading, and we have some information, you have other information. Maybe we both do not have the same information. So you write yours from yours, and we make our judgment from ours.

And you will not, in your chapter, talk about the information we have, and what our distinguished chairman relates, and his experience. Do not forget that you have a chairman here who has pretty good experience as it relates to this and understands it probably better than most.

We are all caught in a Catch 22, and the politician will get the blame. You will get a royalty, and I hope that it is controversial enough that you make a lot of money.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Senator, I would never claim, as a historian, to have the last word on anything. And I have always been interested—

Senator FORD. You will have the last word in that chapter. You might write another one. It is like Harry Truman said, he wanted a one-armed economist.

Mr. LINENTHAL. My job as a historian in this is certainly to make my own judgments about this event, but also to lay out what I see as the variety of issues that arose here, to help people understand the texture and the complexity of this issue. There is a difference between writing a history and an op-ed piece. I take that responsibility very seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, let me read you one comment from your statement today. "Museums, particularly public museums, have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of various groups in the shaping of public exhibitions. But the integrity of the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum exhibit, that seeks a careful rendition of the past is threatened when any interest groups become an arbiter of public history."

I have two questions for you. One is, are you saying to us that public funds, taxpayers' money, could be used and ought to be used without any comment, by people who seek to be revisionists as far as the accepted view of history? And secondly—this is personal—I have a Japanese daughter-in-law and I have a grandson. I know that in her country they are teaching that in the history of World War II, we were, in fact, the aggressors. I am going to bring my grandson to this museum. I have taken all my children, and now I am going to start taking my grandchildren to this museum. I do not want my grandson to walk out of that museum and ask me why I was one who was the aggressor, and why did I try to kill Japanese babies.

Now, on what basis do you justify an interpretation of the history of this event so different from those of us who lived through it? On the basis of scholarly enterprise?

Mr. LINENTHAL. The way that I read even the first script, I never interpreted the first script in that way. It would never have occurred to me, in reading that first script, to look at Americans as aggressors. Of course, public museums have a responsibility to those who pay the bills. And those who pay the bills, I would hope, would trust those who are charged with creating public exhibitions with a certain level of professional expertise.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute now. Let us get very specific. The statement in the script was "For most Americans it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture against Western imperialism."

Mr. LINENTHAL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want my grandson to read that and look me in the eye and say Grandpa, why did you do that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Can I speak to that issue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LINENTHAL. First of all, everyone recognized that that was a very clumsy and badly written label. It went out after the first script. And yet, for months and months thereafter, that phrase was used by the media to show what they called the pro-Japanese bias of the curators.

Now what I would like to do briefly, Senator, is to address each of those issues, because I think frankly, standing on their own, each one of those statements is not anywhere near—

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to defend your own statement, that we should allow taxpayers' funds to be used to support a book or a museum exhibit on the basis of scholarly enterprise, despite the fact that it goes against the commonly accepted viewpoint as to the interpretation of the history of the event?

Mr. LINENTHAL. The question of—

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you are telling me in that statement, is it not?

Mr. LINENTHAL. History is always contested.

The CHAIRMAN. But you say in that statement that I should have stayed out of this, because scholarly judgment should rule in the use of public money, to support the exhibition if it is accepted by the people who have been selected to supervise this presentation from a scholarly point of view?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not think you needed to stay out of it at all. I think that there are ways—

The CHAIRMAN. But it gets around to that point of view, because that is what you are saying to us.

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I think there are ways of being involved that may have asked, for example, the museum or the curators what was meant by this. Now that last statement, that this war was a war of vengeance and that the Japanese were defending themselves against Western imperialism and all of this, at the end of the war almost every public opinion poll cited said that roughly 13 percent of the American population wanted the Japanese exterminated as a race.

Was there not good reason, during the war, for a sense of righteous vengeance on the part of Americans for what had been done in Nanking, for Pearl Harbor, for the Bataan Death March, for the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war? The beloved war correspondent Ernie Pyle, when he went to the Pacific Theater near the end of the war, said this is a very different war and we look upon this enemy in a very different way than we do in Europe. In Europe, we saw them as human beings, here we do not.

Now that is Ernie Pyle speaking and not me. Virtually every Pacific—

The CHAIRMAN. You fail to differentiate between the way we felt about the Japanese military and the way we felt about the Japanese people. That is an unfair interpretation of the history of my generation. We did not hate the Japanese. We do not hate the Japanese. We did hate the people who were conducting that war in such a brutal way. There is a distinction, I think, that veterans still feel today, in the way we feel about the former Japanese military and the way we feel about the Japanese people. And that poll reflected the way we felt about the Japanese military.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well, all I can say, Senator, every Pacific war veteran that I have interviewed said to me that they understood this war as fundamentally different from the war in Europe. Edwin C. Bearss, a very respected historian, a Pacific war combat veteran who was a member of our advisory committee and someone I am proud to claim as a friend, for whom I worked at the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, said to me you know, for all of us in the Pacific war, the war was to the knife, and the knife was to the hilt.

So what I am saying to you is that that phrase was meant to suggest that the war in the Pacific had a particular kind of anger and vengeance of the racist policies of the Japanese toward other Asians and toward Americans, with American views of the Japanese.

And the second part of that, that this was a war for the Japanese to defend themselves against American imperialism was a very clumsy way of the curators trying to say this is why the Japanese were fighting so ferociously and almost senselessly at the end of the war. Now put together in the way that it was, it could in fact have been read as an indictment. And everybody recognized that and said look, this is going to be misinterpreted, this is going to be read wrong. You have got to take it out. The curators understood it themselves.

That phrase went out after the first script and 6, 7, 8 months later that phrase was still being used by people to pillory the museum and the curators. That, I think, is unfair.

Yes, of course, you have a responsibility and an obligation to be involved. I would have hoped that the involvement of the public would have first have been to think perhaps about the volatility of these issues, these different narratives that the Smithsonian was trying to balance, the heroic and the tragic, and not immediately jump to accusing the curators as being anti-American. I think that was unfortunate.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, that is what this hearing is about. The question has to be why is the Smithsonian, the pre-eminent depository of our history and the artifacts thereof, hiring someone who writes that first draft? You do not see it the way we do.

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. The first draft was not scholarly, it was revisionist and did not belong in the Smithsonian to start with. And that has been admitted by the changes.

We will go on to the next witness. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are going to turn to Secretary Heyman, Dr. Crouch, and Ms. Newman, please. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC, ACCOMPANIED BY CONSTANCE B. NEWMAN, UNDER SECRETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, AND THOMAS D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM

Mr. HEYMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am Michael Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and I am accompanied by Constance Newman, who is the Under Secretary, and Thomas Crouch, who is the Assistant Director for Aeronautics of the National Air and Space Museum, and was involved with the *Enola Gay* exhibition. On the next panel, I will be joined by Dr. Maxine Singer, chair of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution.

Before answering questions, I would like to make a few observations. As you know, I became Secretary of the Smithsonian on the 19th of September of 1994, so I have been there about 8 months. I began my tenure at a time of considerable controversy over the exhibition of the *Enola Gay*. I had some great concerns about and disagreement with the first script. In fact, it was not any secret to anyone because I commented in my installation address that our first script was deficient. I believed then, and I believe now, that too much of the context of the use of the atomic bomb was taken for granted, and that the proposed exhibition was out of balance, hence appearing to be historically inaccurate.

It was my view that in late October we had turned that corner. We benefitted by a long consultation with knowledgeable representatives of the American Legion, observations by other veterans organizations, and a substantial revamping by curatorial staff of the proposed exhibit that produced a much more balanced script. The revamped exhibit included a new 4,000 square foot section on the war in the Pacific, and extensive revisions to the script throughout. While these organizations did not endorse the exhibit, in part waiting for its finishing touches, they did not oppose it. Thus in January, I believed that we could