

Senator FORD. Mr. Chairman, if I understand, the Secretary's statement is broken down into two phases, with a first panel and a second panel. Now we are not going to have the testimony that way, as I understand. We are just going to have testimony on *Enola Gay* and then we are going to have—then they are going to come back? We have kind of jockeyed back and forth. I have some questions and I did not want to lose you.

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I will be on that second panel also. So long as I can make a 2:50 plane to San Francisco where I have to give a speech tonight if that is at all possible. Or would you prefer to have questions first—

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you are prepared to come back next week, Doctor.

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I am prepared to stay here for a good period of time. I just wanted you to know—

The CHAIRMAN. We have other things scheduled, too. That is all right, we will proceed with Dr. Crouch if that is your desire.

Mr. HEYMAN. Then I thought we would both answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I intend to continue this until we get answers to our questions and until we get some understanding of what the management situation is at the Smithsonian. If you wish to have Dr. Crouch testify now, Dr. Crouch, we will listen to you.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM

Mr. CROUCH. Thank you, Senator. I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss matters related to the exhibition that was to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Those of us who were involved with that project hoped to tell the story of the *Enola Gay* and the bomb that it carried in a full, honest, balanced fashion. We sought to explore a moment in time, a turning point in the history of our world, an event that ended one era and inaugurated another. At the very least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To all of those who have been hurt or angered by this controversy, I apologize for that misjudgment.

The committee has asked me to clarify the roles and the responsibilities of the individuals involved in developing the content of the exhibition. As head of the department of aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me and supervised the two curatorial assistants assigned to the project. I reported to Martin Harwit, director of the National Air and Space Museum who established the general direction of the project and approved the various documents produced by the curators.

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft of the script completed in January 1994 was imperfect. It was short on context, although not so short I think as some of the critics have suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities against Asian people, the Japanese reliance on slave labor, and their brutal treatment of prisoners-of-war, Pearl Harbor, biological experiments on human subjects were all noted in the script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their preference for death rather than surrender, the kamikaze campaign, and rising Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points of the first unit.

Still, it is clear that we should have provided much fuller coverage of those subjects and underscored the roots of Japanese militarism and imperialism.

In addition, the introductory unit and some other sections of the scripts contained a number of sentences that became genuine hot buttons. Believe me, I wish they had never seen the light of day. Those sentences were removed from the script at the time of the first review.

I would ask the committee to recognize the fact that the script was genuinely a first draft subject to a process of careful revision that began with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong advisory committee. That group included Pulitzer Prize winning authors. It included an ex-president of the American Historical Association. It included some of the leading scholars in the field; individuals who had spent their lives studying the topic.

We also wanted to ensure that a variety of points of view would be represented on the advisory committee. Richard Hallion, chief historian of the Air Force and his deputy would speak for the Air Force. Dr. Ed Bearss, a distinguished military historian, wounded veteran of the war in the Pacific, and chief historian of the Park Service was also represented on the panel. Ed Linenthal, who had worked closely with the Park Service, the Holocaust Museum, and other organizations seeking to understand the nature of commemoration was present for the same reason. We were honestly confident that this group could assist us in developing an accurate script, and also help us to understand how it might be received by a wide range of visitors.

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script, they were also very generous in their praise of the document. The comments of Harvard professor Akira Iriye, ex-president of the American Historical Association are typical. "I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to unfair criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent one reflecting current historical scholarship. I applaud your valiant effort to present an informative, balanced story of the atomic bombing."

Ed Bearss, historian of the Park Service concurred with that judgment. "As a World War II combat veteran I commend you

and your colleagues." And so on and so forth. I will not read all of the quotes here. They are in the written testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not reading your whole statement. Do you want it to appear in the record as you presented it or as you are reading it?

Mr. CROUCH. As presented, Senator. I am cutting it down because of the length of time. I do not want to try the committee's patience.

In spite of the work of the advisory committee, as early as 1993 leaders of the Air Force Association had registered strong opposition to the draft proposal describing the exhibition. This is before the script was issued. The group received a copy of the script at the same time that it went out to the advisory committee along with a request for comment and an invitation to discuss concerns and participate in the process of revision. The Air Force Association published the first of a series of critical articles in the April 1994 issue of Air Force Magazine that in one way or another I think represented the beginning of the deep controversy at any rate.

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and positive way, the museum turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Committee which assisted us in obtaining the advice and comment of historians employed by the military services. In addition to those efforts, Dr. Harwit created a Tiger Team, the six members of which were asked to identify any signs of imbalance in the script.

The new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high percentage of the changes suggested by all of the group which had read the document to date. Some of the leading military historians and several members of the Tiger Team expressed satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense remarked, "My overall impression of the *Enola Gay* script was favorable. It shows evidence of careful research and an effort to realize a balanced presentation."

But the new script did not satisfy the most vocal critics. In mid-July a veterans review committee composed of representatives of the Air Force Association and leading U.S. veterans organizations was invited to give the script an additional review. From mid-summer to the end of the year continued discussions with all of these organizations led to a steady stream of additional script changes.

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the situation. A large introductory unit very much expanded our coverage of the Pacific war, which had been growing at any rate through the earlier script modifications. The videotape recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally intended to appear inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at the exit where it would draw more attention.

Finally, the under secretary of the Institution and the director of the museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit down with those of us on the exhibition team and work our way through the script. That effort produced the final version, as you know, which some critics regarded as acceptable. But it did not resolve the controversy. As a result, Secretary Heyman cancelled the original project in January.

Most of our critics, obviously, blame the failure of the project on the deficiencies of the original script. As I have acknowledged, the first draft was imperfect and I am sorry for that. I would remind you, however, that that document had the support of the members of the distinguished advisory committee and a substantial number of other authorities in the field. The revised script issued in June attracted even broader support. I believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars refutes the charge that early versions were bad history.

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of balance. Those of us who developed the exhibit certainly believe that the experience of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an essential element in the whole telling of the story. I think most of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us can certainly agree that the atomic bombing of Japan has to be understood within the context of the justice of the Allied cause and the incredible heroism of those who fought and died to push the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific.

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and the intentions of the curatorial team when he commented that, "The original script had a great potential to convey a larger dimension of tragic ambiguity without denying the bravery of individual American fighting men or the worthiness of the fight against Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, but I thought the first script gave every promise of doing so."

Our critics took issue with the ambiguity to which Professor Dower refers. While the exhibit was never intended to attack the justification for the use of the bomb, for example, it did suggest that the decision had been the subject of considerable study and analysis over the past half-century. Most of all, I think, we failed to appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind memory of the bomb to the incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of the war. As individuals and as an institution, those of us at the museum have paid a high price for that misjudgment.

In closing, I simply want to assure you that I remain committed to the mission of the National Air and Space Museum and to the mandate of the Smithsonian to increase and diffuse knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and will do my best to answer any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:]

STATEMENT OF TOM D. CROUCH, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF
AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM

I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss matters related to the exhibition that was to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of WW II." We hoped to tell the story of the *Enola Gay* and the bomb that it carried in a full, honest, and balanced fashion. We sought to explore a moment in time; a turning point in the history of our world; an event that ended one era and inaugurated another. At the very least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To all of those who have been hurt or angered by this controversy, I apologize for that misjudgment.

The Committee has asked me to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved in developing the content of the exhibition. As head of the Department of Aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me, and supervised the two curatorial assistants assigned to the project. I reported to Martin Harwit, Director of the National Air and Space Museum, who established the general direction of the project, and approved the various documents produced by the curators.

The first draft of the exhibition script, completed in January 1994, was produced by the four members of the curatorial team. I was the primary author of one of the five units of the document. Dr. Neufeld prepared two of the units. The other two units of the script were the product of joint effort. As curator of the exhibition, Dr. Neufeld edited all of this material into a coherent document.

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft, completed in January 1995, was imperfect. It was short on context, although not as short as some of our critics have suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities committed against Asian peoples, the Japanese reliance on slave labor and their brutal treatment of prisoners of war, Pearl Harbor and biological experiments on human subjects were all noted in the script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their preference for death rather than surrender, the Kamikaze campaign, and rising Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points of the first unit. Still, I acknowledge that we should have underscored and provided fuller coverage of the roots and earlier phases of the struggle to defeat Japanese militarism.

In addition, the introductory unit contained two "hot button" sentences that I wish had never seen the light of day. "For most Americans, this war was fundamentally different than the one waged against Germany and Italy—it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture..."

While both nations had other goals, surely Americans were justifiably determined to avenge Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, and the Japanese, facing defeat in 1945, were determined to protect what they regarded as their unique culture. Moreover, those two sentences appeared in a label calling attention to the "naked aggression and extreme brutality of Japanese expansionism." Still, they were very clumsy and did not express the thought intended. We removed them from the script immediately after the first review.

The script was a first draft, subject to a process of careful revision that began with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong advisory committee. That group included Akira Iriye, Richard Rhodes, Martin Sherwin, Stan Goldberg, Barton Bernstein and other leading scholars in the field.

We also wanted to insure that a variety of points of view would be represented. Richard Hallion, Chief Historian of the USAF, and his deputy, Herman Wolk, would speak for the Air Force; Ed Bearss, a distinguished military historian and a wounded veteran of the War in the Pacific, had, as chief historian of the National Park Service, handled veterans complaints regarding programs at Pearl Harbor; Ed Linenthal has worked closely with the Park Service, the Holocaust Museum and other organizations seeking to understand the nature of commemoration. We were confident that this group could assist us in developing an accurate script, and also help us to understand how it might be received by a wide range of visitors.

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script, they were also very generous in their praise of the document. The comments of Harvard Professor Akira Iriye, an ex-president of the American Historical Association, one of our most distinguished students of the Pacific War, and a leading member of the advisory committee, are typical.

I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to unfair criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent one reflecting the current historical scholarship. I . . . applaud your valiant effort to present an informative, balanced story of the atomic bombing.

Ed Bearss, Chief Historian of the National Park Service, concurred with that judgement.

As a World War II combat veteran, I commend you and your colleagues who have dared to go that extra mile to address an . . . internationally significant event in an exhibit that, besides being enlightening, will challenge its viewers . . . The superior quality of the label texts and of the objects and illustrations. . . sets a pattern that all aspire to but few achieve.

Professor Barton Bernstein of Stanford University regarded the script as: ". . . fair, balanced, and historically informed," noting that it "reflected current scholarship on the war, the bombing and the use of the atomic bombs. . . ." Stanley Goldberg has called attention to "the unanimous agreement at the advisory board meeting that the initial approach of the curators was sound," and congratulated members of the team on "a careful and professional job." A great many other scholars who were not initially involved in the project have also expressed their support for the early drafts.

As early as November 1993, however, leaders of the Air Force Association (the AFA) had registered strong opposition to a draft proposal describing the exhibition. The group received a copy of the script at the same time that it went out to the advisory committee, along with a request for comment and an invitation to discuss their concerns and participate in the process of revision. The AFA replied in April 1994 with the first of several critical articles in Air Force magazine.

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and positive way, the museum turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Committee, which assisted us in obtaining advice and comment from historians employed by the military services. In addition to these efforts, Dr. Harwit created a "Tiger Team," the six members of which were asked to identify "any signs of imbalance" in the script.

A new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high percentage of the changes suggested by all of the groups which had read the document to date. Some of the leading military historians and several members of the "Tiger Team" expressed satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, remarked: "My overall impression of the *Enola Gay* script is favorable. It shows evidence of careful research and an effort to realize a balanced presentation . . ."

But the new script did not placate the most vocal critics. In mid-July a Veterans Review Committee, composed of representatives of the AFA and leading U.S. veterans organizations, was invited to give the script an additional review. From mid-summer to the end of the year, continued discussions with all of these organizations led to a steady stream of additional script changes.

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the situation. A large introductory unit expanded our coverage of the Pacific War. The video-taped recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally intended to appear inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at the exit where it would draw more attention. Finally, the Undersecretary of the Smithsonian and the Director of museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit down with members of the exhibition team and work their way through the script. That effort produced a final version of the script which some critics regarded as acceptable, but it did not resolve the controversy. As a result, Secretary Heyman cancelled the original project in January 1995.

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would remind you, however, that the document had the support of most of the members of a distinguished advisory committee and a substantial number of other authorities in the field. The revised script issued in June attracted even broader support. I believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars refutes the charge that the early versions of the script were "bad history."

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of balance. Those of us who developed the exhibition believe that the experience of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an essential element of any full telling of this story. I think most of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us agree that the atomic bombing of Japan must be understood within the context of the justice of the Allied cause, and the incredible heroism of those who fought, and died, to push the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific.

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and intentions of the curatorial team when he commented that: "the original script had a great potential to convey . . . [a] larger dimension of tragic ambiguity . . . without denying the bravery of individual American fighting men, or the worthiness of the fight against Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, but I thought the first script gave every promise of doing so."

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In closing, I want to assure you that I remain committed to the mission of the National Air and Space Museum, and to the mandate of the Smithsonian Institution to increase and diffuse knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today, and will do my best to answer any questions that the Committee may have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Heyman, I want you to know we recognize that you came into this matter after it started and if you want to defer to others to answer questions, we would be happy to have you do that. I will try to limit mine on the first round here, but I do have a series of questions I want to get answers to, if we can.

Does the Smithsonian intend now to display the *Enola Gay* on a permanent basis anywhere after the scaled-down exhibit is over?

Mr. HEYMAN. We certainly intend to exhibit it, sir, when we have a place to exhibit it. We cannot put it in the Air and Space Museum because it is too big. So the intention has been to exhibit it at Dulles as the extension begins to be built out.

The CHAIRMAN. There are members of the groups that have criticized the Smithsonian who have urged that you place it on display at another prominent area. There are several prominent areas for display of artifacts of the air war of World War II. Have you considered doing that?

Mr. HEYMAN. My view about that is that when we take this exhibit down, if there is an opportunity to lend the *Enola Gay* to another place and we can work out the expenditures for getting it there and getting it back and its maintenance, we would certainly take quite seriously a request for it to be lent and exhibited elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would be receptive to a request from these organizations that it be displayed just as an artifact somewhere in the country?

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, sir. But we would like to retain ownership of it for its eventual display as part of our collection.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you envision someday the museum would be large enough to hold that as a permanent exhibit?

Mr. HEYMAN. I think if we build out what we intend to build out at Dulles, the extension of the Air and Space Museum, we will have the requisite room. That is the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not really view the Dulles site and facility as being very accessible to many people. But that is another question; we will deal with that later.

In your letter to Congressman Johnson you stated that you were conducting an examination of how the exhibits are framed philosophically at the outset. Could you tell us the status of that examination?

Mr. HEYMAN. What I am trying to put together is a procedure so that prospective exhibitions are quite well reviewed. The first step in that, in my view, is for those within a museum to deal with, to be consulted on, to discuss fully the plan of any curator or curators for an exhibition, to look at what the purpose is, to get a full explication of how it is supposed to work, and to start to make judgments with regard to whether or not it is framed properly in order to be accurate and full and balanced.

Let me give you an example. My biggest problem with the first script of the *Enola Gay* is how it was framed. It was an inquiry into the use of atomic weapons with a sidebar, a secondary look at the *Enola Gay* and the use of the atomic weapons in ending the Second World War. I think that, at least now that I have become more sophisticated about this, if I had been involved at all at the outset, and if I had thought about it very hard, I think I could begin to predict some of the problems that would arise if that is the way an exhibit was to be framed to be held at the time that it was.

I want the museums in the first instance to really take that seriously. I want to be put on notice whenever an exhibit is begun to be discussed which could be a controversial exhibition in the terms that we are talking about or perhaps other ones. Then secondly, I want those procedures to state quite clearly that—and we are talking about historical exhibitions here basically—that not only should we be putting together an historian's committee to assure accuracy, but that if there are special groups that are specially affected by an exhibition, that they are consulted meaningfully too, and early enough so that that consultation affects the design of the exhibition.

I want to put those in writing. We are getting close to being able to do that. I want an elaboration of them from each of the museums. I want accountability with regard to whether or not they are being followed. And I want to be informed personally,